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Audit Market Concentration and Audit Quality 
 
Abstract 
 
Policymakers and regulators have been concerned about the impact of audit 
market concentration resulting from decline in the number of audit firms due to 
mergers and the demise of Arthur Andersen. In this paper we find a positive 
association between audit market concentration (Herfindahl index) at the MSA 
level and audit quality (measured by discretionary accruals and the Dechow-
Dichev (2002) measure of accrual quality). We control for fixed year effects, 
therefore our results are unlikely to be affected by the increase in concentration 
due to Andersen’s demise contemporaneous with an increase in audit quality 
because of regulatory measures such as SOX. Our results are robust to alternative 
concentration and audit quality measures, and several sensitivity tests 
attempting to rule out omitted variables correlated with client firms’ MSA 
location or attributes of clients and auditors. Our results are also robust to 
controls for endogeneity between audit market concentration and audit quality. 
Our evidence therefore supports the Government Accountability Office (2003, 
2008) conclusions that increased audit market concentration is not currently a 
cause for concern.  
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Audit Market Concentration and Audit Quality 
1 Introduction 
Audit market concentration has received much attention in recent times, as the 
number of big audit firms has decreased from eight to six in 1989 and to five in 1998 due 
to mergers, and to four in 2002 after the demise of Arthur Andersen. In response, the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) mandated that the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) study the implications of consolidation on competition, client choice, audit fees, 
and, the focus of this paper, audit quality. The GAO Report (Government Accountability 
Office, 2003) concludes that increased concentration had reduced client choice, but did 
not seem to affect price competition in audit markets. On the relation between 
concentration and audit quality it concludes that the evidence is sparse, and the limited 
research evidence that is available is mixed and inconclusive (Government 
Accountability Office, 2003 pp. 35-42). Reflecting continuing concern over audit market 
concentration, GAO on its own initiative subsequently conducted another study 
(Government Accountability Office, 2008) which reiterated the conclusions of the 
previous study. To provide evidence on the relation between concentration and audit 
quality, GAO surveyed market participants, most of whom said that audit quality had 
improved, and attributed it to the SOX. Nevertheless, GAO (2008 p. 32) cautions that 
high concentration could in principle increase or decrease audit quality. The relation 
between concentration and audit quality is therefore an important issue that remains 
unresolved.  
In this paper we examine the relationship between audit quality (proxied by absolute 
discretionary accruals and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality, as 
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explained in Section 2.2) and audit market concentration (Herfindahl index) at the city 
(MSA or metropolitan statistical area) level. Previous research uses going-concern 
qualifications (DeFond et al., 2002), restatements (Kinney et al., 2004), or accruals-based 
earnings quality (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh 
et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Myers et al., 2003; Larcker and Richardson, 
2004; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007) as proxies for audit quality. Following Myers et al. (2003 
p. 782), we use accruals-based earnings quality measures because our interest is in a 
broad measure, not restricted to extreme occurrences such as going-concern audit 
opinions or restatements. 
Within a single country, variations in audit market concentration can be obtained 
across city markets, markets segmented by client size, or industry. We calculate our 
primary concentration measure at the city (MSA) level because a large body of research 
beginning with Francis et al. (1999), described in Section 2.1, argues that audit markets 
are indeed local. There is also evidence indicating that audit markets are segmented by 
client size—small audit firms cannot effectively compete with the Big 5 for large clients 
(Government Accountability Office, 2008 pp. 37-42)—so we also report the results of 
supplementary analysis in which we calculate concentration separately for large and 
small clients within each MSA. Given that each Big 4 audit firm has clients in every 
industry, we doubt that there is any significant industry segmentation of audit markets 
and do not pursue an analysis of the relationship between industry-level concentration 
and audit quality. 
We find a positive association between audit quality and concentration, after 
controlling for the determinants of audit quality identified in previous research. Our 
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results are robust to alternative measures of audit quality and concentration. The results 
do not statistically vary between subsamples of the data partitioned by MSA size, client 
firm size, by whether or not all Big 5 audit firms are present in an MSA or not, and by 
industry-specialist versus non-specialist auditors. A potential threat to the validity of our 
finding could be that audit market concentration and audit quality are endogenously 
determined, i.e., if in a particular MSA some audit firms exogenously provide high 
quality, clients could migrate towards such audit firms, thereby affecting concentration. 
To address this issue we use an instrumental variables approach with exogenous 
instruments for audit market concentration, and we continue to find a positive association 
between concentration and audit quality.  
Previous literature on audit market concentration has documented trends in auditor 
concentration over time (Eichenseher and Danos, 1981; Danos and Eichenseher, 1986; 
Hogan and Jeter, 1999; Cairney and Young, 2006) or the effect of concentration on audit 
fees (Simunic, 1980; Maher et al., 1992; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Iyer and Iyer, 
1996). Our paper adds to the literature by linking audit market concentration to audit 
quality, an important public policy issue. 
To interpret our findings and relate it to a broader literature, we rely on the idea that 
concentration proxies for competition. This idea comes from the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm in the Industrial Organization Economics literature beginning with 
Bain (1956), where barriers to entry are thought to result in concentration and thereby to 
higher profits. Although recent work in industrial organization has questioned whether 
concentration measures competition, the objections relate to inter-industry studies, 
particularly where the barriers to entry such as advertising and R&D that determine 
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concentration are endogenous. Sutton, who is prominently associated with the idea that 
barriers to entry and therefore concentration are endogenous (Sutton, 1991), nevertheless 
accepts in his survey article (Sutton, 2007 p. 2307) that concentration is a valid measure 
of competition across different geographical markets within the same industry. In 
banking, concentration in different geographical markets is commonly used as a measure 
of competition in those markets, for example in Petersen and Rajan (1995). 
Theoretical results in Chaney et al. (2003) link competition to audit quality; the 
relationship is ambiguous--they show that competition could a priori either reduce or 
increase audit quality.
1
 This is because an increase in competition reduces the profits that 
can be earned from a client and hence reduces the cost of telling the truth in respect of a 
client who would prefer otherwise. Increase in competition however also increases the 
probability of the client switching after being disappointed by the auditor, and so 
increases the auditor’s cost of telling the truth.  
As a check of the concentration-competition link in our sample, we estimate an audit 
fee model with concentration and control variables from previous literature 
(Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant, 2009) as independent variables. Since concentration 
is lower in large MSAs where wages and hence audit fees tend to be high, we control for 
median wages of accounting profession in the MSA, MSA area, and MSA rank (by 
population). We use three measures of concentration: (a) concentration for Big 5 clients 
only, (b) concentration based on audit fees, and (c) on the number of clients. The relation 
is positive and significant for two measures, (a) and (c). For (b), based on audit fees, the 
relation is positive and significant but only at the 10 percent level for a one-tailed test. 
                                                          
1
 Among other reasons to expect concentration to affect audit quality, GAO (2003, pp. 36-37) mentions that 
concentration could affect auditor tenure and audit firm size, which in turn could affect audit quality.  
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The result therefore supports, albeit weakly, the idea that concentration is associated with 
less price competition. 
Previous empirical papers in auditing have investigated the link between competition 
and audit quality by focusing on solicitation or bidding restrictions (Jeter and Shaw, 
1995; Hackenbrack et al., 2000), with conflicting results. Hackenbrack et al. (2000) find 
indirect evidence of higher audit quality (clients engaged larger, more specialized, 
auditors and were more likely to be recognized for reporting excellence) in a regime with 
restrictions on bidding (low price competition). Jeter and Shaw (1995), on the other hand, 
find that in the post-solicitation (more competitive) regime auditors were more likely to 
qualify opinions, which indicates a positive association between competition and audit 
quality. Thus empirical findings about the competition-quality relationship in auditing 
have been ambiguous. Our paper adds to the debate by suggesting that competition might 
be associated with lower audit quality. However, competition has many aspects (price 
competition, competition for market share, quality competition, etc.) and there are static 
and dynamic dimensions to quality; we make no claim that our result definitively 
resolves the ambiguity in prior literature. 
Overall, our results support GAO’s (2003, 2008) conclusions that existing levels of 
concentration do not cause problems with audit quality. Indeed, our results suggest the 
opposite—that concentrated audit markets are associated with higher audit quality. 
However, given that our study does not resolve the ambiguity in the previous literature, 
policy prescriptions based on its results are premature. Our result is based on variation in 
concentration in the existing system and we cannot predict what will happen if 
concentration increases beyond existing levels if another audit firm goes out of existence 
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because of bankruptcy or merger. Moreover, public policy may be justifiably concerned 
about concentration’s effect on the choice of auditors available to clients, or the 
possibility of regulatory capture by a small number of large auditors—issues not 
addressed in our study. 
2 Proxies for audit market concentration and audit quality  
2.1 MSA-level Herfindahl index as a measure of audit market concentration 
We measure concentration at the local (MSA, i.e., metropolitan statistical area) level. 
For each MSA and each year, we measure concentration using the Herfindahl index (H), 
computed as the sum of the squares of the ratios of each audit firm’s size to the total size 
of the audit market: 
,]/[ 2
1
SsH
N
i
i

  
where, N is the total number of audit firms in the MSA; si is the size of audit firm i; 
and S is the total size of audit market in the MSA. Following GAO (2008) we define size 
of each audit firm (si) based on audit revenues, i.e., the total audit fees earned from audit 
clients listed in Audit Analytics Auditor file. Similarly, we calculate the total size of audit 
market (S) as the sum of each audit firm’s size. If all audit firms are of equal size then H 
equals 1/N and is higher when N is small. For a given N, H is higher when the audit 
firms’ market shares are unequal, i.e., some firms are larger than others. We also measure 
concentration using four-firm concentration ratios. Our results are similar to those using 
H, so we do not report them in the tables. 
Our ability to obtain variation in concentration within a sample of U.S. clients relies 
on the assumption that audit markets are local. Penno and Walther (1996), Wallman 
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(1996), and Francis et al. (1999) argue that audit markets are indeed local. Choi et al. 
(2008) show that clients of local auditors (auditors located close to the headquarters of 
the client firm) report lower discretionary accruals and local Big 4 auditors charge lower 
fees than do non-local Big 4 auditors, suggesting that the audit market structure is more 
local than national. Consistent with this, Choi et al. (2008) report that 82 percent of 
clients are audited by auditors through their practice offices located in the same MSA, 
and 91 percent of clients are audited by audit offices located within 150 miles. 
Even if audit market concentration is local, our ability to detect differences in audit 
quality across local markets depends on audit quality varying across different offices of 
the same audit firm. Recent research increasingly suggests that incentives (Wallman, 
1996; Reynolds and Francis, 2001), expertise (Francis et al., 1999, 2005), and reputation 
(Chaney and Philipich, 2002) are indeed local; and that this translates into differences in 
pricing and quality (Krishnan, 2005; Choi et al., 2008, 2009; Francis and Yu, 2009). 
Wallman (1996) and Reynolds and Francis (2001) argue that auditor independence is 
more important at the practice office level rather than at the audit firm (national level). 
Francis et al. (2005) show that auditors who are industry specialists at both the national 
and local levels charge a fee premium, suggesting a local component to industry expertise. 
Chaney and Philipich (2002) find that the disclosure of document shredding by Arthur 
Andersen affected the stock prices of its Houston office clients more than that of its other 
clients, suggesting a local component to reputation. Choi et al. (2009) and Francis and Yu 
(2009) show that large city offices provide better quality audit services compared with 
smaller city offices of the same audit firm, suggesting that audit quality is audit-office-
specific rather than audit-firm-specific.  
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Following Penno and Walther (1996) and Francis et al. (2005), we define each 
metropolitan area, identified using the U.S. Census Bureau definition of metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA), as a local market.
2
 Since the evidence also suggests that non-Big 
4 auditors cannot effectively compete for large clients, we also calculate concentration 
separately for large and small clients within each MSA. 
One objection to studying the impact of concentration on audit quality could be that 
concentration and audit quality are endogenous—if some audit firms in a certain MSA 
exogenously provide higher quality audits, clients may prefer such firms, increasing 
concentration and resulting in a positive relation between concentration and audit 
quality.
3
 We control for potential endogeneity by using a 2SLS instrumental variables 
approach, but do not find statistically significant evidence of endogeneity using the 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test (see Section 4.104.9 below).  
We have followed GAO (2008) above in using audit fees as the basis to compute 
concentration. However, audit fees are associated with certain client-specific attributes 
(e.g., client audit risk, complexity) and auditor-specific attributes (e.g., Big 5 premium), 
and such associations could impact its validity as a basis for a concentration measure. 
Therefore as alternative measures of concentration we calculate the Herfindahl index 
using (a) the total number of clients for each audit firm and (b) aggregated total assets of 
all clients for each audit firm as the basis.
4
  
                                                          
2
 When multiple offices from the same audit firm exist in certain MSAs, we assume that they share audit 
resources and that competition among them is minimal, and thus treat them as the same audit firm. 
3
 Alternatively if some audit firms exogenously offer poor quality and clients prefer such firms, a negative 
relation could arise between concentration and quality. This possibility is less of a concern because it is the 
opposite of the result we find. 
4
 That is, for these alternative measures, we define size of each audit firm (si) as the number of their audit 
clients or the sum of total assets of their audit clients and the total size of audit market in the MSA(S) as the 
sum of all audit firms’ size in the MSA for the calculation of the Herfindahl index. 
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It is possible that the market structure for audit services among large clients is 
different from that among smaller clients in certain MSAs because large clients may be 
able to choose only Big 5 auditors when selecting auditors due to their size and 
geographic diversity. To take into account the possibility of a two-tier audit market, we 
compute concentration separately for large clients of Big 5 auditors, and for all other 
clients of both Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors in each MSA. We use the size (measured as 
total assets) of the largest non-Big 5 client in each MSA as the cut-off between two size-
groups of clients.
5
  
We have posited a linear relation above between concentration and audit quality, but 
the functional form of this relation could be non-linear. Given that the exact form of the 
relation is unknown, we follow DeFond and Park (1999) and obtain two transformed 
concentration measures (based on audit fees) by taking the square root of concentration 
and by ranking MSAs based on concentration. 
2.2 Empirical proxies for audit quality 
Following previous studies (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Frankel et al., 
2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Myers et al., 2003; Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007) we use accruals-based earnings quality as 
measures of audit quality. As our main measure, we use discretionary accruals estimated 
by the Jones (1991) model as modified by Ball and Shivakumar (2006), which allows for 
a piecewise-linear relation between cash flows and accruals. As additional measures, we 
                                                          
5
 We assume that all non-Big 5 clients and Big 5 clients smaller than the largest non-Big 5 client have a 
choice between a Big 5 auditor and a non-big 5 auditor when selecting their auditors while all other Big 5 
clients greater than the largest non-Big 5 client have a limited choice only within Big 5 auditors. For these 
two-tier concentration measures, we define size of each audit firm (si) for large-sized (small-sized) client 
market as the total audit fees earned from their large-sized (small-sized) audit clients and the total size of 
audit market for large-sized (small-sized) clients in the MSA (S) as the sum of all audit firms’ size for 
large-sized (small-sized) clients in the MSA for the calculation of the Herfindahl index. 
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use performance-adjusted discretionary accruals suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) and 
accrual quality measures developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as modified by 
McNichols (2002), and further adapted by Srinidhi and Gul (2007) to the auditing context.  
Other audit quality measures used in previous studies include the occurrence of 
restatements, and auditors’ propensity to issue going-concern modified audit opinions. 
Our focus in this study is on audit quality in a broad cross-section of firms, rather than 
audit quality in specialized situations such as going-concern modifications or 
restatements; earnings quality measures are therefore more appropriate as Myers et al. 
(2003 p. 782)  point out.  
Earnings quality is the joint product of managers and auditors. Kinney and Martin’s 
(1994) conclusions support the use of earnings quality as a measure of audit quality. They 
review several studies that examine actual audit work papers to determine which earnings 
issues were identified by auditors and whether they were adjusted or waived, and 
conclude that auditors have a pervasive effect on pre-audit earnings. More recent 
evidence in Nelson et al. (2002) continues to indicate that pre-audit earnings are adjusted 
in a substantial percentage (44 percent) of cases where the auditor identified a potential 
misstatement. Because earnings quality could be affected by managers’ actions as 
opposed to auditors’ actions, we attempt to control for managers’ incentives to mis-state 
earnings using a set of control variables such as the presence of a loss, leverage, and 
capital-raising. In sensitivity analysis we also control for other variables such as client 
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firm complexity (presence of foreign subsidiaries and number of business and 
geographical segments), and litigation risk.
6
 
Another limitation of accruals-based measures is that accruals may be high not 
because of opportunistic earnings management, but because discretion in accruals may be 
used by managers to communicate their information (Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995; 
Subramanyam, 1996). The Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure controls for the 
informativeness of accruals and we therefore use it as another measure of audit quality. 
2.2.1 Our main proxy for audit quality  
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) augment the Jones model and control for the role of 
accounting conservatism on managers’ discretion in reporting earnings by including three 
additional variables, namely CFOjt/TAjt-1, DCFOjt, and (CFOjt/TAjt-1)*DCFOjt, as follows: 
 
,]*)/[(]/[
]/[]/)[(]/1[/C
16514
1312111
jtjtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjtjt
DCFOTACFODCFOTACFO
TAPPETARECREVTATACRA
jt






 (1) 
where, for firm j and in year t (or t - 1),  
ACCR  =  total accruals equal to income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from 
operations (Compustat #123- Compustat #308);  
TA  =  total assets (Compustat #6); 
ΔREV  =  changes in net sales (Compustat #12); 
ΔREC =  changes in receivables (Compustat #2); 
PPE  =  gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat #7); 
CFO  =  cash flows from operations (Compustat #308); 
DCFO  =  dummy variable equal to 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise; and 
ε  =  error term.  
 
                                                          
6
 We do not use these variables in the main regression because the sample size would decrease substantially 
for lack of data. 
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Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that accounting accruals incorporate economic 
losses in a timelier manner than they do economic gains; they incorporate this asymmetry 
by modeling accruals as a piecewise linear function of current-period cash flows from 
operations. The dependent variable, total accruals (ACCR), and all independent variables 
are deflated by beginning total assets. Eq. (1) is estimated for each two-digit SIC code 
industry within each year, provided there are at least 10 observations.  Our measure of 
discretionary accruals is the difference between actual total accruals and the fitted values 
from Eq. (1). We denote this measure by DA_BS. Because audit quality is high when 
absolute DA_BS is low, we use absolute DA_BS multiplied by -1 as our proxy for audit 
quality. 
2.2.2 Alternative proxies for audit quality 
As alternative measures of audit quality, we first estimate performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals using the model suggested by Kothari et al. (2005), which is 
computed as follows. For each two-digit SIC code industry and year with a minimum of 
10 observations, we estimate the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones-model in 
Eq. (2). Residuals from Eq. (2) are DA before adjusting for firm performance. 
1 1 1 2 1 3 1    / [1/ ] [( ) / ] [ / ]jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jtACCR TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA                (2) 
Kasznik (1999) and Kothari et al. (2005) point out that unadjusted abnormal accruals 
are significantly correlated with firm performance. Following Kothari et al. (2005), we 
match each firm-year observation with another from the same two-digit SIC code with 
the closest return on assets (ROA) to control for firm performance. We then compute 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, namely DA_KLW, by taking the difference 
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between DA of one firm (before performance-based adjustment) and DA of another firm 
from the same two-digit SIC code industry that has similar ROA in the previous year.  
Our second alternate metric for audit quality is the accrual quality measure 
developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and modified by McNichols (2002). 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model earnings quality as accruals quality--accruals are of 
high quality if they map into past, current, and future cash flows effectively. McNichols 
(2002) suggests that including the original Jones-model variables (i.e., ΔREV and PPE) in 
the model improves performance of the model. Thus, we obtain the second alternative 
measure by calculating the time series standard deviation of residuals from a cross 
sectional regression estimated from the following equation: 
1 2 1 3 3 1 4 5    jt jt jt jt jt jt jtWCA CFO CFO CFO REV PPE                          (3) 
Where, for firm j and in year t (or t - 1),  
∆WCA  =  change in working capital, defined as -(∆AR + ∆INV + ∆AP + ∆TAX + ∆OTH); 
∆AR  =  change in receivables (Compustat #302); 
∆INV  = change in inventory (Compustat #303); 
∆AP  =  change in payables (Compustat #304); 
∆TAX  = change in tax payable (Compustat #305); 
∆OTH  = change in other current assets (Compustat #307);  
CFO  = cash flow from operations (Compustat #308); 
ΔREV  =  change in net sales (Compustat #12);  
PPE  =  gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat #7); and 
υ  =  error term.  
 
All variables above are deflated by average total assets. Eq. (3) is estimated for each 
two-digit SIC code industry with at least 10 observations in a given year. Then we 
calculate the standard deviation of residuals υt, termed σ(υ), for each firm over the years t-
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4 to t. The larger the standard deviation of residuals the greater is the noise in earnings 
and the lower is the quality of earnings, hence the lower is the audit quality. Our proxy 
for audit quality is therefore σ(υ) multiplied by -1. For this measure we restrict the sample 
to all firms that have data required to estimate Eq. (3) in each of the five years t to t-4; 
this results in a fewer number of observations for tests using this measure as compared to 
that for tests using other discretionary accruals measures. Given that this measure is 
subject to a longitudinal data restriction, we also use the absolute value of the residual υt 
from Eq. (3) multiplied by -1 as another proxy for accrual quality as proposed by Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) and Srinidhi and Gul (2007). 
3 Sample selection, research design, and results  
3.1 Sample selection 
We begin sample selection with all client firms having data about auditor identity, 
audit engagement office, and audit fee from the Audit Analytics database for the seven-
year period from 2000 to 2006. We remove observations where auditors are not located 
in one of 280 MSAs defined in the U.S. 2000 Census because we calculate concentration 
measures at the MSA level, as discussed earlier. 
We start with 67,167 unique observations located in 179 MSAs. We match these 
observations with Compustat and remove financial institutions and utility firms (SIC 
codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999) because the Jones-model-type abnormal accruals may 
not be meaningful for these firms. After matching with Compustat for control variables, 
we are left with 27,756 observations for the tests with our main proxy for audit quality. 
We use all available observations in the Audit Analytics database to calculate the 
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Herfindahl index; this ensures that the Herfindahl index calculation is unaffected by 
observations deleted due to non-matching with Compustat.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on our main regression variables. It 
shows that the median value of absolute discretionary accruals (DA_BS) estimated based 
on Ball and Shivakumar (2006) is 5.3 percent of total assets, and the mean is much larger 
at 11.8 percent. These statistics are similar to the findings in the prior studies which use 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals in their analyses (Becker et al., 1998; Choi et 
al., 2009; Myers et al., 2003; Reynolds and Francis, 2001). Median concentration (the 
Herfindahl index) is 0.252, and is similar to the value reported in Table 9 of the GAO 
report (Government Accountability Office, 2008). Because few recent studies have used 
concentration, we report further descriptive statistics about concentration in Panels B and 
C of Table 1. Panel B classifies MSAs according to the number of Big 5 audit firms 
located in them. The distribution of MSAs by the number of Big 5 audit firms is U-
shaped (we count the maximum number of Big 5 audit firms present in an MSA during 
the sample period; therefore Andersen is counted in a particular MSA if it was in that 
MSA before its demise): there are only five MSAs with three Big 5 firms present, and the 
number of MSAs having fewer as well as higher number of Big 5 firms is greater. Thirty 
seven of the 137 MSAs in our sample have no Big 5 firms present, and 40 have all Big 5 
firms. These 40 MSAs account for the overwhelming majority of our sample (25,678 of 
27,756 client firm year observations). Median concentration in MSAs with zero Big 5 
firms is 1, i.e., each of a majority of the 37 MSAs that have zero Big 5 audit firms has 
only one non-Big-5 audit firm that has clients in the Audit Analytics database. Mean 
concentration across MSAs decreases monotonically with the number of Big 5 audit 
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firms: the mean concentration for MSAs with zero Big 5 firms is 0.867 whereas the mean 
concentration in MSAs with all the Big 5 firms present is only 0.257. For the sub-sample 
of 40 MSAs with all Big 5 audit firms present (n=25,678), Panel C shows that audit 
market concentration decreases with MSA population in the U.S. 2000 Census. The mean 
concentration in low-population MSAs is 0.315, in high-population MSAs it is 0.245. 
Table 2 shows the correlation between the variables of interest in our study. In Panel 
A we find that the Pearson correlations between the four alternative accruals-based 
proxies for audit quality are high, ranging from about 30 to 60 percent. Similarly, in 
Panel B we see that the alternative measures of concentration are also very highly 
correlated though not perfectly. The Pearson correlations range from about 60 to 99 
percent. Further, we find that the main measure of concentration based on audit fees is 
positively correlated with audit quality proxied by (-1)*|DA_BS|. This provides 
univariate evidence supporting that audit quality is higher when concentration is higher. 
The correlations between the other variables are not high enough to suggest that 
multicollinearity is a problem in our data.   
3.2 Relation between concentration and audit quality 
To examine the relation between concentration and audit quality, we estimate the 
following equation:  
Audit quality = β0 + β1 Concentration + β2 Size + β3 Short tenure + β4 Sales change  
 + β5 Book to market + β6 Loss + β7 Leverage + β8 Issue  
 + β9 Cash from operations + β10 Big 5 + β11 Industry specialist 
 + β12 Firm age + β13 Client importance + β14 Fee ratio  
 + β15 Lagged accruals + Σ γjIndustry  + Σ θtYear + ω  (4) 
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Where  
Audit quality  =  audit quality, proxied by either (-1)*|DA_BS|, (-1)*|DA_KLW|, 
(-1)*σ(υ), or (-1)*| υt |. 
DA_BS  =  discretionary accruals based on Ball and Shivakumar (2006), 
which is the difference between actual total accruals and the fitted 
values estimated from Eq. (1). Because high absolute DA_BS 
indicates low audit quality, we multiply it by -1 and use negative 
absolute value to proxy for audit quality; 
DA_KLW  =  performance-adjusted discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. 
(2005), which is the difference between unadjusted DA of one firm 
(the residual value estimated from Eq. (2)) and DA of another firm 
from the same two-digit SIC code industry that has similar ROA in 
the previous year. We multiply it by -1 to use negative absolute 
value of DA_KLW as a proxy for audit quality; 
υt  =  residuals estimated from Eq. (3) based on Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) as modified by McNichols (2002). We multiply it by -1 to 
use negative absolute value of υt as a proxy for audit quality; 
σ(υ)  =  standard deviation of residuals υt estimated from Eq. (3), which is 
calculated for each firm over the years t-4 to t. Because high σ(υ) 
indicates low audit quality, we multiply it by -1; 
Concentration  =  Concentration of audit market by MSA, measured by the 
Herfindahl index of audit fees by auditor office, as described in 
Section 2.1; 
Size  =  log of total assets in thousands (Compustat #6); 
Short tenure  =  dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is in the first or second 
year of the audit engagement and 0 otherwise;  
Sales change  =  Changes in net sales [Compustat #12 – Lag(Compustat #12)] 
deflated by lagged total assets; 
Book to market  =  Ratio of book value (Compustat #60) to market value (Compustat 
#199 times Compustat #25), winsorized at 0 and 4; 
Loss  =  dummy variable equal to 1 if reported net income (Compustat 
#172) is less than zero, and 0 otherwise; 
Leverage  =  Ratio of total liabilities (Compustat #181) to total assets; 
Issue  =  dummy variable equal to 1 if the sum of the debt issued 
(Compustat #111) and equity issued (Compustat #108) during the 
past 3 years is more than 5% of the total assets, and 0 otherwise; 
Cash flow from operations =  Cash flow from operations (Compustat #308) deflated by lagged 
total assets; 
Big 5  =  dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is one of PWC, KPMG, 
AA, EY, DT, and zero otherwise; 
Industry specialist  =  dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is an industry specialist 
both at the national level and at the city (MSA) level, and zero 
otherwise. Following Reichelt and Wang (2008), an auditor is 
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defined as a national (city) industry specialist if it has an annual 
audit fee market share greater than 40 percent in an industry, based 
on the two-digit SIC code in the national (city) audit market; 
Firm age  =  log of the number of years for which total assets was reported in 
Compustat since 1974; 
Client importance  =  audit fees paid to the auditor divided by total audit fee revenues of 
the audit office that the auditor belongs to;  
Fee ratio  =  ratio of non-audit service fees relative to total fees (i.e., the sum of 
non-audit fees and audit fees) received from the client firm; 
Lagged accruals  =  one-year lagged total accruals; Accruals are defined as income 
before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) minus cash flow from 
operations (Compustat #308) deflated by lagged total assets; 
Industry  =  Industry dummies based on industry classification by Barth et al. 
(1998). 
Year  =  year dummies from 2001 to 2005. We omit FY 2000, which is 
therefore captured in the intercept. 
 
We estimate the above OLS model using the pooled sample correcting for clustering 
by firm and year (Petersen, 2009).
7
 The variable of interest in the equation is 
Concentration. A positive relation between Concentration and Audit quality suggests that 
audit quality is higher in more concentrated audit markets perhaps due to greater 
bargaining power resting with the auditor.  
We include a set of control variables that are shown by prior literature to affect 
discretionary accruals. Size (log of total assets) is included because larger firms tend to 
have lower accrual estimation errors and lower discretionary accruals and therefore 
higher accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). A dummy variable indicating short 
tenure of the auditor (Short tenure) is included because Myers et al. (2003) find that firms 
with short auditor-client relationships have higher magnitude of discretionary accruals 
(lower audit quality). A dummy variable for loss-reporting firms (Loss) is included 
because such firms have a greater incentive to take a big bath. We include two variables 
                                                          
7
 Alternatively we cluster the standard errors at the MSA level and by year. Our results remain similar. 
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to proxy for firm growth, Book to market and Sales change, because McNichols (2000) 
suggests that firms with higher growth tend to record a greater amount of discretionary 
accruals (i.e., lower audit quality). We expect Book to market (an inverse measure of 
growth) to be positively related to audit quality, and Sales change to be negatively related 
to audit quality. A dummy variable for equity- or debt-issuance (Issue) is included 
because firms raising capital tend to manage earnings more aggressively (Teoh et al., 
1998). We include Leverage because Becker et al. (1998) suggest that firms with higher 
leverage have incentives to manipulate earnings to keep from breaching their debt 
covenants. Following Ashbaugh et al. (2003) we include Cash flow from operations to 
control for correlation between accruals and cash flow performance. Firm age is added 
because accruals differ with changes in firm life cycle (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; 
Myers et al., 2003). Fee ratio and Client importance are included to control for the 
possible influences of non-audit fees and quasi-rents specific to clients on the auditor’s 
incentive to compromise independence (Frankel et al., 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003). 
We include Lagged accruals to control for variations in the reversal of accruals over 
time. Industry and year dummies are included to control for differences across industries 
and changes over time in discretionary accruals and accruals quality.  
Reichelt and Wang (2009) find that auditors who are both national and city-specific 
industry experts have clients with lower abnormal accruals.
8
 Because auditor industry 
specialization, at least at the city (MSA) level, is determined by the market share of the 
large auditor, concentrated audit markets are likely to have a greater number of clients 
audited by industry specialist auditors. To ensure that we do not attribute to audit market 
                                                          
8
 In contrast, they find that abnormal accruals of clients audited by national industry experts alone (without 
being city-specific industry experts) or by city industry experts alone (without being national industry 
experts) are not significantly different from those audited by non-industry experts.   
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concentration the previously documented effect of industry specialist auditors, we control 
for auditor industry specialization at both nation-level and MSA-level by combining them 
into one measure (Industry specialist) based on Reichelt and Wang (2009).  
We present the results of estimating Eq. (4) in Table 3. When audit quality is proxied 
by negative absolute DA_BS (i.e., (-1)*|DA_BS|) in the full sample (Column 3) the 
coefficient on Concentration is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.037, t-value = 
4.99, p-value = 0.001) suggesting that concentration is associated with high audit 
quality.
9
  
The coefficients on control variables are mostly in line with evidence reported in 
prior studies. Similar to findings in Myers et al. (2003) and Choi et al. (2009), we find 
that large firms (Size), firms with better cash performance (Cash from operations), and 
higher quality auditors (Big 5) have higher audit quality proxied by negative absolute 
DA_BS while firms with higher leverage (Leverage) have lower audit quality. Further, 
consistent with McNichols (2000) we find that firms with higher growth options (low 
Book to market and high Sales change) have lower audit quality. The coefficients on 
Short tenure and Industry specialist are insignificant at the 0.10 level. Although these 
results are inconsistent with those of Myers et al. (2003) and Reichelt and Wang (2009) 
respectively, Francis and Yu (2009) report similar weak effects of these variables using a 
recent sample over the 2003-2005 period. Although not reported, the coefficients on 
dummy variables indicating fiscal year 2001-2006 are positive and increasing, and this 
could be because increased regulatory monitoring arising from the SOX has curtailed 
earnings management. Given that our results hold after controlling for the fixed year 
                                                          
9
 We drop eight observations with extreme values of the Belsley et al. (1980) DFBETAS statistic. Our 
results and inferences are all similar if we do not drop these observations. 
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effects, it is unlikely that our results are attributable to the increase in concentration 
arising from Arthur Andersen’s demise and the contemporaneous increase in audit 
quality because of regulatory measures such as the SOX.   
To further examine whether the effect of Concentration on audit quality differs 
systematically between clients with income-increasing discretionary accruals and those 
with income-decreasing discretionary accruals, we split the full sample into two sub-
samples with positive and negative discretionary accruals (i.e., DA_BS > 0 and DA_BS < 
0). We then estimate Eq. (4) separately for each sub-sample and report the results in 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.
10
 In these columns, the dependent variables is still 
(-1)*|DA_BS| so that positive coefficients of variables indicate positive associations with 
audit quality.
11
 We find that the positive association between concentration and audit 
quality holds for both sub-samples of positive and negative discretionary accruals and so 
is not driven solely by either income increasing or income decreasing accruals. 
Specifically, the coefficients on Concentration are positive and significant in both 
columns (0.047 with t-value=4.49, and p-value=0.001 in Column 4 and 0.023 with t-
value=2.07 and p-value=0.040 in Column 5) suggesting that concentration is related to 
higher audit quality for both sub-samples. 
                                                          
10
 Because the dependent variables are truncated at zero in these regressions, we also use truncated 
regressions instead of regular OLS as a robustness check and our results are qualitatively similar. 
11
 Similar to Myers et al. (2003), we consider the more negative discretionary accruals the lower audit 
quality for clients with income-decreasing accruals as the SEC does not view the use of income-decreasing 
accruals as appropriate because it creates ‘cookie jar reserves’ (Levitt, 1998). For example, the SEC took 
legal steps against Microsoft Corp. for inappropriately using income-decreasing accruals (Wall Street 
Journal, 2002). 
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3.3 Relation between concentration and alternative measures of audit quality 
Earlier we described alternate proxies for audit quality measured by (a) 
(-1)*|DA_KLW| where DA_KLW is performance-adjusted discretionary accruals based on 
Kothari et al. (2005); (b) (-1)*| υt | where υt is residuals estimated from Eq. (3) which is 
developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002); and (c) 
(-1)*σ(υ) where σ(υ) is standard deviation of residuals υt estimated from Eq. (3), which is 
calculated for each firm over the years t-4 to t.  We use these alternative accrual-based 
proxies for audit quality to account for potential errors associated with each measure. We 
substitute these three alternative proxies for audit quality in estimating Eq. (4) and report 
the results in Columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 4.
12
 We find that the coefficient on 
Concentration is positive and significant at the 0.01 level in all three cases. When the 
dependent variable is (a), (b), or (c) above, the coefficients on Concentration are 0.038 (t-
value=5.11, p-value=0.001), 0.014 (t-value=3.82, p-value=0.001), and 0.015 (t-
value=4.35, p-value=0.001) respectively. This suggests that our finding of the positive 
association between audit market concentration and audit quality is robust to the use of 
these alternative proxies for audit quality.  
Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) suggest that poor accrual quality can be 
due to innate features of a firm’s business model such as its operating environment and 
complexity of transactions, or it could be due to discretionary factors such as managerial 
accounting choices and accruals manipulation. Since the innate factors of | υt | and σ(υ) in 
(b) and (c) are mainly driven by a client firm’s operating environment, we expect that 
                                                          
12
 For the model where the dependent variable is (-1)*σ(υ) in Column 5, the sample size is much smaller (n 
= 14,327) because calculating firm-level standard deviation of υt  requires data for all variables in the Eq. 
(3) over years t-4 to t.   
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audit quality would be better proxied by the discretionary factors of | υt | and σ(υ), when 
(-1)*| υt | or (-1)*σ(υ) are used as a measure of audit quality respectively. For this 
purpose, we decompose both | υt | and σ(υ) into an innate and a discretionary component 
each based on the approach outlined in Francis et al. (2005),
13
 and substitute (-1) times 
the discretionary component from | υt | or σ(υ) [i.e., (-1)*Disc | υt | and (-1)*Disc σ(υ)] 
into Eq. (4) for audit quality. The results are presented in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4. 
Consistent with our expectation, we find that both (-1)* Disc | υt | and (-1)* Disc σ(υ) are 
significantly positively related to Concentration. The coefficients on Concentration when 
the dependent variables are (-1)* Disc | υt | and (-1)* Disc σ(υ) are 0.008 (t-value=2.46, 
p-value=0.007) and 0.008 (t-value=2.73, p-value=0.001) respectively. This suggests that 
as concentration increases audit quality proxied by negative discretionary component of 
|υ| or σ(υ) also rises 
3.4 Relation between alternative measures of concentration and audit quality 
As we explained earlier, we calculate the following alternative proxies for 
concentration: (a) Herfindahl index based on number of client firms, (b) Herfindahl index 
based on aggregate size of client firms’ assets, (c) and (d) separate Herfindahl indexes for 
subsamples of large and small client firms, where large clients are defined as clients 
having assets exceeding those of the largest non-Big-5 auditee, (e) square root of the 
Herfindahl index based on audit fees, and (f) rank transform of Herfindahl index based on 
audit fees.  
                                                          
13
 Specifically, we regress firm-specific standard deviation of residuals υt (σ(υ)) over the years t-4 to t (and 
the absolute value of υt) on firm size (the market capitalization), cash flow volatility, sales volatility, 
operating cycle, and loss proportion following Eq. (8) of Francis et al. (2005). The predicted values from 
this estimation capture the innate component while unexplained portions (the residuals) capture the 
discretionary component.  
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We re-estimate Eq. (4) using these alternative concentration measures, and present 
the results in Columns 3-8 of Table 5. We find that concentration is significantly 
positively related with our main measure of audit quality (i.e., (-1)*|DA_BS|) for each of 
these alternative measures of concentration. The coefficient on Concentration when it is 
measured based on the number of audit clients is 0.040 (t-value=4.05, p-value=0.001). 
The coefficient on Concentration when it is measured based on the total assets of audit 
clients is 0.018 (t-value=2.68, p-value=0.007). We conclude that our results stay 
qualitatively similar when these alterative metrics are used for the calculation of 
concentration.  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 show that concentration is significantly positively 
related with audit quality for both big and small clients of Big 5 auditors. The coefficient 
on Concentration when it is measured for only the large client market (Column 5) is 
0.023 (t-value=2.60, p-value=0.009). Similarly, the coefficient on Concentration when it 
is measured for the rest small client market (Column 6) is 0.064 (t-value=6.25, p-
value=0.001).
14
 Results in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 show that the positive relation 
between concentration and audit quality is insensitive to the functional form of 
concentration. The coefficient on the square root of concentration is 0.049 (t-value=4.88, 
p-value=0.001) and that on the rank of concentration is 0.00013 (t-value=3.06, p-
value=0.002).  
                                                          
14
 Alternatively, when we compute concentration separately for only clients of Big 5 auditors and for only 
those of non-Big 5 auditors and estimate Eq. (4) separately for the two groups, Concentration is 
significantly positively related to audit quality in each group. 
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3.5 Relation between concentration and audit quality for different audit markets 
As Panels B and C of Table 1 show, audit market concentration depends on the 
number of Big 5 firms present in an MSA and on the population of the MSA. We perform 
several analyses to check whether our results differ with MSA size and for certain class 
of client firms in this section.  
First, to examine whether our observed relation between concentration and audit 
quality differs for large MSAs and small MSAs, we create a dummy variable Large MSA 
which is equal to one for the 15 largest MSAs in terms of audit market size measured by 
total audit fees earned by all audit firms in the MSA during our sample period, and zero 
otherwise. We include Large MSA and its interaction with Concentration in Eq. (4) and 
re-estimate the equation. Column 3 of Table 6 shows the results of this estimation. The 
coefficient on Concentration now captures the effect of concentration on audit quality for 
all but the 15 largest MSAs. This coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient = 
0.038, t-value=4.84, p-value = 0.001). The coefficient on Concentration* Large MSA 
captures the differential impact of concentration on audit quality for the 15 largest MSAs. 
This coefficient is positive but insignificant (coefficient=0.004, t-value=0.19, p-value = 
0.890). This result suggests that the relation between concentration and audit quality is 
not significantly different for the 15 largest MSAs, compared to the rest of the MSAs.   
Second, it is possible that large MSAs may have a greater number of large client 
firms. Prior research (Chung and Kallapur, 2003) argues that auditors’ incentives to 
compromise their independence could vary with the size of clients because of the 
differences in the quasi-rent streams, the probability of detecting audit failure, and the 
consequences of such detection, between small and large clients. Therefore, in addition to 
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controlling for firm size in Eq. (4), as a further analysis, we create a dummy variable 
Large firm which takes the value one if the firm size is greater than the median, and zero 
otherwise. We then interact Large firm with Concentration and re-estimate Eq. (4). The 
coefficient on Concentration now captures the effect of concentration on audit quality for 
small firms and the coefficient on the interaction term captures the differential impact of 
concentration on audit quality for larger firms. As shown Column 4 of Table 6 where we 
detail the results of this estimation, the coefficient on Concentration is 0.047 (t-
value=4.40, p-value=0.001) and the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.022 (t-
value=-1.04, p-value=0.290). This shows that the impact of concentration on audit quality 
is not statistically significantly different for large and small clients. 
Third, not all MSAs have all the Big 5 auditors’ audit offices. This can cause the 
nature of the audit market to substantially differ between MSAs with all 5 Big 5 auditors 
and those with fewer Big 5 auditors. For this reason, we create a dummy variable (Max 
Big5) that takes on the value of one if all the Big 5 auditors operate in a particular MSA 
and zero otherwise. We then interact Max Big5 with Concentration and estimate Eq. (4). 
The results from this estimation are shown in Column 5 of Table 6. The coefficient on 
Concentration is positive and significant (Coefficient=0.038, t-value=4.28, p-
value=0.001) which suggests that the relation between concentration and audit quality is 
positive for MSAs where not all the Big 5 operate. The coefficient on the interaction term 
is positive and insignificant (Coefficient=0.022, t-value=0.98, p-value=0.340). This 
implies that the positive relation between concentration and audit quality is not 
significantly higher in MSAs where all the Big 5 operate, compared to the remaining 
MSAs.  
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Fourth, clients from certain industries may cluster in some MSAs. Moreover, the 
market share of industry specialist auditors may vary in different industries. As shown in 
Table 3, Concentration is associated with audit quality even after controlling for industry 
fixed effects and industry specialization of auditors. To further investigate whether the 
positive association between concentration and audit quality is stronger for clients of 
industry specialist auditors, we examine the interaction between industry specialization 
(defined in Eq. (4)) and Concentration by estimating Eq. (4) after including such an 
interaction variable. The results provided in Column 6 of Table 6 show that the relation 
between concentration and audit quality proxied by negative absolute value of DA_BS 
remains significantly positive for the main effect (for clients of non-specialist auditors) as 
indicated by the coefficient on Concentration (coefficient=0.037, t-value=5.05, p-
value=0.001). However, the interaction between Industry specialist and Concentration is 
not significantly different from zero (coefficient=0.009, t-value=0.11, p-value = 0.917). 
This result suggests that the relation between concentration and audit quality is not 
significantly different for clients of industry specialist auditors compared to clients of 
non-specialist auditors. Although the effects of omitted correlated variables can never be 
completely ruled out, our results are robust to some of the obvious possibilities that we 
examine above. 
4 Sensitivity tests  
4.1 Weighted regression 
Since MSAs differ in the number of client-year observations, we weight the 
regression with (inverse of) the number of clients. The coefficient on Concentration is 
significantly positive (coefficient=0.040, t-value=41.49, p-value=0.001) when audit 
28 
 
quality is proxied by negative absolute value of DA_BS. This sensitivity check suggests 
that our results are not impacted by different MSAs having different number of clients. 
4.2 Controlling for volatility of sales, cash flows and length of operating cycle 
We examine whether our results are robust to inclusion of additional control 
variables. First, we include controls for the operating cycle and volatility of sales and 
cash flows in our regression. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show that accruals quality 
depends on the length of the operating cycle and volatility of sales and cash flows. Hribar 
and Nichols (2007) suggest that using absolute discretionary accruals as the dependent 
variable potentially biases the test in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management and that adding volatility of sales and cash flows in the model as additional 
controls substantially improves test specifications.
15
 Thus, we add these additional 
control variables to our regression model and find that our results are stay qualitatively 
similar. When the dependent variable is negative absolute value of DA_BS, the 
coefficient on Concentration is 0.024 (t-value=2.18, p-value=0.029) with these additional 
variables controlled.
16
 
4.3 Controlling for client complexity 
Prior literature on audit fee models has shown that firm complexity is related to audit 
fees. Since we use audit fees as a basis for calculating the concentration measure, it is 
necessary to properly control for client complexity to account for their impact on the 
                                                          
15
 We measure the operating cycle by [(sales/360)/(average accounts receivable)+(cost of goods 
sold/360)/average inventory]], the volatility of sales by standard deviations of cash-based revenues (sales + 
∆accounts receivable) (deflated by lagged total assets) for the years t - 4 to t, and the volatility of cash 
flows by standard deviations of operating cash flow (deflated by lagged total assets) for the years t - 4 to t. 
16
 We report results in Table 3 excluding these variables because the requirement of these additional 
variables substantially lowers our sample size. For example, the requirement of cost of goods sold that is 
necessary for calculation of the operating cycle reduces our sample by 2,939 observations.  
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concentration measure. We estimate Eq. (4) after including two measures for complexity. 
The first is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the client has a foreign 
subsidiary, and the second is the square root of the number of business and geographic 
segments disclosed. We find that the coefficient on Concentration is 0.039 (t-value=5.19, 
p-value=0.001) with these variables included in Eq. (4). This shows that controlling for 
these client complexity variables does not impact the relation between concentration and 
audit quality even though the basis of measurement of concentration is audit fees. 
4.4 Controlling for litigation risk 
Auditors’ incentives to perform high-quality audits are affected by the fear of being 
sued. Thus litigation risk against auditors can be an important factor determining audit 
quality and it is important to control for the auditor litigation risk in estimating Eq. (4). 
To account for the litigation risk, we include the factor weights documented by Shu 
(2000), where she describes a litigation model to compute a probability of litigation 
against auditor for each firm for each year. Since this model has some data restrictions, 
the number of observations falls by 6,623 observations. We find the coefficient on 
Concentration is 0.024 (t-value=3.34, p-value=0.001) after including a variable for the 
probability of litigation. The coefficient on the probability of litigation is -0.035 (t-
value=-1.57, p-value=0.120). This analysis suggests that our main result is unaffected by 
the omitted litigation risk. 
4.5 Controlling for office size 
Recent studies find that individual audit office size has a positive relationship with 
audit quality (e.g., Choi et al. 2009; Francis and Yu 2009). To ensure that our main 
results are not merely picking up the effect of audit office size, we also include a control 
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variable for the size of audit office, measured by the natural log of the total audit fees 
earned from all the clients audited by that audit office, consistent with Francis and Yu 
(2009), and re-estimate Eq. (4). The result indicates that the coefficient on Concentration 
remains positive (0.0353) and significant (t-value=4.73, p-value=0.001). Hence our 
results are robust to controlling for the size of the audit office. 
4.6 Controlling for audit and non-audit fees 
Although we control for client importance and the non-audit fee ratio (Fee ratio) in 
our main tests, as a sensitivity check we examine whether our results are robust to 
inclusion of audit and non-audit fee levels deflated by total assets. This test is necessary if 
auditors trade off audit quality for higher fees or demand a premium for conducting a 
high quality audit. We remove Fee ratio from the equation, and re-estimate Eq. (4). We 
find that Concentration is still positively and significantly (coefficient=0.028, t-
value=3.54, p-value=0.001) related to audit quality proxied by (-1)*|DA_BS| even after 
controlling for these two metrics. Alternatively, when we control for logged audit fees 
and logged non-audit fees in the model, the results stay qualitatively similar. 
4.7 Controlling for auditor choice 
Prior literature suggests that Big 5 auditors perform higher-quality audits. Thus the 
impact of concentration on audit quality could be different for clients of Big 5 auditors 
compared to those of non-Big 5 auditors. For this possibility, we re-estimate Eq. (4) after 
including the interaction between Concentration and Big 5 in the equation. We find that 
the main effect of Concentration, which measures the impact of concentration on audit 
quality for non-Big 5 auditors, is positively and significantly related with audit quality 
(coefficient=0.057, t-value=3.62, p-value=0.001) while the interaction variable is 
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negative but not significant (coefficient=-0.0283, t-value=-1.38, p-value=0.162). This 
suggests that the impact of concentration on audit quality is not significantly different 
between Big 5 audit clients and non-Big 5 audit clients. 
4.8 Excluding cash flows from operations and change in sales 
The two variables cash flow from operations and change in sales are used to estimate 
accrual-based audit quality in Eqs. (1)-(3) and thus they could be orthogonal to our audit 
quality measures. When we drop these two variables from Eq. (4) to check the robustness 
of our results, we find that Concentration is significantly positively related to our 
measure of audit quality. The coefficient on Concentration is 0.045 (t-value=5.40, p-
value=0.001) when audit quality is measured by (-1)*|DA_BS|. 
4.9 Year-by-year analysis of the relation between concentration and audit quality 
Instead of a pooled sample analysis, we conduct a year-by-year analysis and 
calculate a mean t-value using observed yearly coefficients on Concentration for our 
sample period over 2000-2006. We find that the mean coefficient on Concentration is 
0.033 (t-value=3.15, p-value=0.001) when audit quality is proxied by (-1)*|DA_BS|. This 
suggests that cross-sectional and time-series correlation in the error terms does not impact 
our results significantly. 
4.10 Endogenous relation between concentration and audit quality 
Concentration could be endogenous because it is possible that an auditor gains 
market share by performing a higher-quality audit. We use a two-stage instrumental 
variables approach to address this concern. Our arguably exogenous instruments for 
concentration are measures of the costs of operating in that MSA and the attractiveness of 
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the MSA in terms of market size and growth.
17
 For these we use geographic size of MSA 
area, the number of business establishments at the beginning of the year, and the number 
of businesses added during the year, for which data is available from the U.S Census 
Bureau URL: http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/. This data is available for 3 years 2001 to 
2003.
18
 Hence the number of observations that we use to estimate the 2SLS is smaller 
than the full sample (n=13,523 and 7,962 when audit quality is proxied by 
(-1)*|DA_BS|.and -σ(υ), respectively).  
We perform a Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test of whether endogeneity affects 
the results and find no evidence that it does. Therefore we do not think our results are 
affected by endogeneity between audit quality and concentration. Moreover, the positive 
association between audit quality and concentration continues to hold when we use the 
fitted value for concentration from the first stage instead of its actual value.  
4.11 Potential entry by Big 5 auditors to respond to new demand 
When a large client considers requesting audit service from a Big 5 auditor not 
located in certain MSA, it is not uncommon for the auditor to open a new office to 
acquire the client. Hence it is not clear which comes first; the local office or the client, 
and our concentration measure may not take into consideration the potential for new 
entrants in its computation. To address this issue, we calculate the number of unique audit 
offices of Big 5 auditors, and the first year they appear in our sample period. Out of 335 
unique offices, 309 existed in year 2000, which constitutes 92.2%. When we re-estimate 
                                                          
17
 While firm growth is related to discretionary accruals, we do not see any reason why a client’s 
headquarters location in a growing MSA should be correlated with its discretionary accruals after 
controlling for its Sales change and Book-to-market ratio. 
18
 There is data for total number of business establishments in an MSA for several years before 2001 and 
after 2003, however, we are interested in the new businesses added and existing businesses which died 
during the year, for which data is available for only three years 2001 to 2003. 
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Eq. (4) after restricting the sample to MSAs that existed in year 2000, for the period 2001 
onwards, we find that the coefficient on concentration is 0.0380 (t-value=5.33, p-
value=0.001). This suggests that our results are not driven by new offices being opened in 
response to a demand for auditing in an MSA.  
5 Association between audit fees and concentration 
As a separate analysis, we examine whether concentration affects audit pricing. 
While the GAO report concludes that industry concentration in the audit market does not 
significantly impact audit fees (GAO, 2003, 2008), Pearson and Trompeter (1994) 
suggest that audit pricing and concentration could be either positively or negatively 
related. They argue that monopolistic audit pricing in concentrated audit markets could 
explain a positive association between concentration and audit fees and that significant 
economies of scale in concentrated audit markets could explain a negative association 
between concentration and audit fees.  
To obtain insights into this issue, we estimate a standard audit fee model based on 
the model used by Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2009), which incorporates the 
findings of the extensive prior literature on audit fee models. We include in this audit fee 
model Concentration, three MSA level variables to control for MSA level differences in 
audit fees, and Industry specialist. The three MSA level variables are, (a) hourly median 
wage of auditors and accountants obtained from 2007 Metropolitan Area Occupational 
Employment Statistics published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, (b) size of MSA 
area, and (c) the rank of MSA size based on the population of MSA. We use three 
measures of Concentration: (a) concentration only within Big 5 auditors based on Big 5 
clients, (b) concentration based on audit fees, and (c) concentration based on the number 
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of clients. The sample used for the audit fee model includes only Big 5 clients to reduce 
the self-selection problem pointed out by Chaney et al. (2004). The following is the 
model estimated (the definitions of variables are provided below Table 7): 
Ln(Audit fees) = β0 + β1 Concentration + β2 Size + β3 Loss + β4 Firm age + β5 Bankruptcy + β6 Xtra+ β7 
Sqsegs + β8 GC + β9 IC audit + β10 IC weakness + β11 Sign dual + β12 Risk Ind + β13 plan  
 + β14 Foreign + β15 Audit lag + β16 New finance + β17 Sqemps + β18 Inv rec  
 + β19 Mergers + β20 CFO + β21 Liquidity + β22 Restatement + β23 Resignation 
 + β24 Re Diss + β25 Initial + β26 Median wage + β27 Specialist + β28 MSA rank  
 + β29 MSA area + Σ γjIndustry  + Σ θtYear + ω  (5) 
 
We find mixed results for the relation between audit fees and concentration. When 
the proxy for concentration is based on (a) audit fees but only for Big 5 audit clients, we 
find a significant positive relationship (coefficient=0.154, t-value=3.08, p-value=0.002). 
However, when the proxy for concentration is based on (b) audit fees across both Big 5 
and non-Big 5 audit markets, we find a positive but insignificant relationship 
(coefficient=0.086, t-value=1.55, p-value=0.125). Further, when we measure 
concentration based on (c) the number of clients across both Big 5 and non-Big 5 audit 
markets, we find a positive and significant relation between audit fees and concentration 
(coefficient=0.137, t-value=2.10, p-value=0.036). 
Our audit fee tests using (a) and (c) above suggest that as concentration increases 
audit fees also increase. To the extent high concentration indicates a low level of 
competition in the audit market, these results support, albeit weakly, the evidence 
documented in other fields where high competition reduces prices in general, e.g., Weiss 
(1989). 
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6 Conclusions 
Policymakers have been concerned about the effects of audit market concentration, 
given the increase in concentration resulting from the decrease in the number of big 
public accounting firms. One important effect of concentration that has been little 
examined in prior studies is that on audit quality. In this paper we find that concentration 
measured by the Herfindahl index at the MSA level is positively associated with our 
proxies for audit quality. 
Following previous studies, we use various accruals-based earnings quality measures 
as proxies for audit quality. This assumes that high quality audits constrain the extreme 
accrual choices that managers would like to make for financial reporting —the 
assumption is supported by evidence from studies of actual audit working papers 
reviewed in Kinney and Martin (1994) and by evidence reported in Nelson et al. (2002). 
However, reported earnings are a joint product of managers and auditors, so we control 
for managers incentives to manage earnings using variables such as loss, leverage, and 
capital-raising.  
Besides other controls for earnings quality identified in previous studies, we also 
control for fixed year effects; therefore our results are unlikely to be affected by the 
increase in concentration due to Andersen’s demise contemporaneous with an increase in 
audit quality because of regulatory measures such as SOX.  
Our results are robust to the use of alternative concentration measures, namely, 
Herfindahl index based on number of clients and total client assets, separate Herfindahl 
indexes for large and small clients in each MSA, and transformed functional forms of the 
Herfindahl index. We perform several sensitivity tests in an attempt to rule out omitted 
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variables associated with clients’ MSA location or characteristics of auditors and clients. 
We also find our results unchanged after controlling for endogeneity between audit 
quality and concentration. 
Concentration’s effect on audit quality is likely to arise from its relation to 
competition (Chaney et al. 2003). Therefore we examine whether concentration is 
associated with prices, i.e., audit fees. After controlling for audit wages in the MSA, 
MSA size and population, we find some evidence indicating a positive association 
between concentration and audit fees. The results show that the coefficient on 
concentration is statistically significant in two of the three specifications, it is marginally 
significant at the 0.10 level with one-tailed test in the third—we interpret this as weak 
evidence in favor of a concentration-price competition link.   
Our evidence overall supports GAO’s (2003, 2008) conclusions that existing levels 
of concentration do not cause problems with audit quality. Indeed, our results suggest the 
opposite—that concentrated audit markets are associated with higher audit quality. 
However, we make no assertions from our study as to whether further concentration in 
the audit market will be more effective in enhancing audit quality. Given that our result is 
based on the variation in concentration in the existing system, we cannot predict what 
will happen if concentration increases beyond existing levels if another audit firm goes 
out of existence because of bankruptcy or merger. Moreover, public policy may be 
justifiably concerned about concentration’s effect on the choice of auditors available to 
clients, or the possibility of regulatory capture by a small number of large auditors—
issues not addressed in our study. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of variables of interest 
 
Panel A: Variables used in regression analyses (n=27,756) 
 
Variable Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Audit Quality [(-1)*|DA_BS|] -0.118 0.190 -0.130 -0.053 -0.021 
Concentration  0.281 0.115 0.23 0.252 0.293 
Size  12.231 2.253 10.645 12.216 13.762 
Short tenure  0.285 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Sales change 0.108 0.381 -0.024 0.059 0.198 
Book To market  0.580 0.665 0.189 0.408 0.724 
Loss  0.415 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Leverage  0.580 0.647 0.286 0.495 0.697 
Issue  0.455 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Cash from operations 0.003 0.325 -0.024 0.068 0.136 
Big 5 0.772 0.419 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Industry Specialist  0.019 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm age 2.51 0.668 2.079 2.485 3.091 
Client importance 0.109 0.202 0.010 0.030 0.101 
Fee ratio 0.715 2.580 0.106 0.316 0.776 
Lagged accrual 0.167 0.654 0.039 0.078 0.150 
 
 
Panel B: MSA-level audit market concentration by the number of Big 5 firms with office in that MSA 
 
   Concentration 
Number of  
Big 5 firms 
with offices in 
an MSA 
Number 
of MSAs 
Number of 
client firm-year 
observations Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
0  37 153 0.867 0.199 0.705 1.000 1.000 
1  29 250 0.863 0.180 0.758 0.961 1.000 
2  12 421 0.599 0.180 0.488 0.531 0.719 
3  5 277 0.551 0.139 0.466 0.553 0.642 
4  14 977 0.436 0.152 0.320 0.392 0.504 
5  40 25,678 0.257 0.054 0.226 0.245 0.277 
 137 27,756      
 
Note: The sample spans the demise of Arthur Andersen. We count an auditor office in an MSA if it existed 
during any sample year. 
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Panel C: Audit market concentration for MSAs with all Big 5 audit firms, by MSA population 
 
  Concentration 
MSA population 
Number of 
client firm-
year 
observations mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
high  17,574 0.245 0.040 0.220 0.241 0.257 
middle  5533 0.271 0.051 0.229 0.255 0.315 
low 2571 0.315 0.084 0.271 0.308 0.362 
 25,678      
 
Audit Quality [(-1)*|DA_BS|] = (-1)* absolute value of residuals from regression Eq. (1) below; 
1 1 1 2 1 3 1
4 1 5 6 1
C / [1 / ] [( ) / ] [ / ]
[ / ] [( / ) * ] ,
jt
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt jt jt jt
A CR TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA
CFO TA DCFO CFO TA DCFO
  
   
   
 
     
   
 
This equation is estimated for each two-digit, SIC-code industry within each year, provided there are 
at least 10 observations. 
Concentration = Concentration of audit market by MSA, measured by the Herfindahl index of audit fees by 
auditor office, as described in Section 2.1; 
Size = log of total assets in thousands (Compustat #6); 
Short tenure = dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is in the first or second year of the audit 
engagement and 0 otherwise;  
Sales change = Changes in net sales [Compustat #12 – Lag(Compustat #12)] deflated by lagged total 
assets; 
Book to market = Ratio of book value (Compustat #60) to market value (Compustat #199 times Compustat 
#25), winsorized at 0 and 4; 
Loss = dummy variable equal to 1 if reported net income (Compustat #172) is less than zero, and 0 
otherwise; 
Leverage = Ratio of total liabilities (Compustat #181) to total assets; 
Issue = dummy variable equal to 1 if the sum of the debt issued (Compustat #111) and equity issued 
(Compustat #108) during the past 3 years is more than 5% of the total assets, and 0 otherwise; 
Cash flow from operations = Cash flow from operations (Compustat #308) deflated by lagged total assets; 
Big 5 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is one of PWC, KPMG, AA, EY, DT, and zero otherwise; 
Industry specialist = dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is an industry specialist both at the national 
level and at the city (MSA) level, and zero otherwise. Following Reichelt and Wang (2008), an 
auditor is defined as a national (city) industry specialist if it has an annual audit fee market share 
greater than 40 percent in an industry, based on the two-digit SIC code in the national (city) audit 
market; 
Firm age = log of the number of years for which total assets was reported in Compustat since 1974; 
Client importance = audit fees paid to the auditor divided by total audit fee revenues of the audit office that 
the auditor belongs to; 
Fee ratio = ratio of non-audit service fees relative to total fees (i.e., the sum of non-audit fees and audit 
fees) received from the client firm; 
Lagged accruals = one-year lagged total accruals; Accruals are defined as income before extraordinary 
items (Compustat #18) minus cash flow from operations (Compustat #308) deflated by lagged total 
assets. 
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Table 2  
Panel A: Pearson correlations between different measures of audit quality 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. (-1)*|DA_BS| 1.000    
2. (-1)*|DA_KLW| 0.584 1.000   
3. (-1)*σ(υ) 0.411 0.338 1.000  
4. (-1)*| υt |. 0.388 0.294 0.592 1.000 
 
Panel A: Pearson correlations between different measures of concentration 
 
Variable 5 6 7 8 9 
5. Concentration based on audit fees 1.000     
6. Concentration based on number of clients 0.785 1.000    
7. Concentration based on total assets 0.748 0.615 1.000   
8. Square root of Concentration based on audit fees  0.990 0.761 0.735 1.000  
9. Rank of Concentration based on audit fees 0.763 0.620 0.638 0.775 1.000 
 
Panel C: Pearson correlations between independent variables 
 
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
10. (-1)*|DA_BS| 1.00                
11. Concentration  0.07 1.00               
12. Size  0.34 0.05 1.00              
13. Short tenure  -0.08 0.01 -0.17 1.00             
14. Sales change -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.01 1.00            
15. Book to market  0.08 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 1.00           
16. Loss  -0.24 -0.09 -0.37 0.08 -0.20 0.08 1.00          
17. Leverage  -0.20 0.02 -0.12 0.05 -0.09 -0.17 0.14 1.00         
18. Issue  -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11 -0.13 0.11 0.11 1.00        
19. Cash from operations 0.39 0.07 0.35 -0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.44 -0.16 -0.20 1.00       
20. Big 5 0.22 0.01 0.54 -0.27 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.14 -0.02 0.16 1.00      
21. Industry specialist  0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 1.00     
22. Firm Age 0.17 0.09 0.25 -0.10 -0.11 0.04 -0.26 0.02 -0.11 0.19 0.00 0.01 1.00    
23. Client importance -0.03 0.28 -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.36 -0.04 0.10 1.00   
24. Fee ratio 0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 1.00  
25. Lagged accruals -0.18 -0.03 -0.11 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.12 0.11 0.04 -0.14 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.01 1.00 
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n = 27,756 for all variables except correlations involving different audit quality measures (i.e., Panel A), for which n = 14,327. All correlations in Panels A and B 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Given a sample size of 27,756, correlations exceeding 0.012 are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, 
and those exceeding 0.015 are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
DA_KLW = performance-adjusted discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. (2005), which is the difference between unadjusted DA of one firm (the residual 
value estimated from Eq. (2)) and DA of another firm from the same two-digit SIC code industry that has similar ROA in the previous year. We multiply it 
by -1 to use negative absolute value of DA_KLW as a proxy for audit quality. 
υt = residuals estimated from Eq. (3) which is developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002). We multiply it by -1 to use negative 
absolute value of υt as a proxy for audit quality. 
σ(υ) = standard deviation of residuals υt estimated from Eq. (3), which is calculated for each firm over the years t-4 to t. Because high σ(υ) indicates low audit 
quality, we multiply it by -1. 
See Table 1 for other variable definitions.  
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Table 3 
 
Relationship between audit quality (using its main proxy, i.e., (-1)*|DA_BS|) and audit market 
concentration. DA_BS is calculated based on the Ball and Sivakumar (2006) methodology. Concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl index of audit fees by auditor office in each MSA, as described in Section 2.1. 
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics of estimating the regression equation: 
Audit quality = β0 + β1 Concentration + β2 Size + β3 Short tenure + β4 Sales change  
 + β5 Book to market + β6 Loss + β7 Leverage + β8 Issue  
 + β9 Cash from operations + β10 Big 5 + β11 Industry specialist 
 + β12 Firm age + β13 Client importance + β14 Fee ratio  
 + β15 Lagged accruals + Σ γjIndustry  + Σ θtYear + ω  (4) 
 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Column 3 
Audit quality 
(-1)*|DA_BS| 
Column 4 
Audit quality 
DA_BS>0 
Column 5 
Audit quality 
DA_BS<0 
  Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) 
Concentration + 0.037 (4.99)
***
 0.047 (4.49)
***
 0.023 (2.07)
**
 
Size + 0.013 (7.92)
***
 0.018 (10.18)
***
 0.009 (4.75)
***
 
Short tenure + -0.002 (-0.54) -0.002 (-0.50) -0.003 (-0.51) 
Sales change - -0.060 (-7.95)
***
 -0.055 (-9.13)
***
 -0.060 (-4.18)
***
 
Book to market + 0.008 (3.39)
***
 0.004 (1.15) 0.012 (4.67)
***
 
Loss - -0.006 (-1.31) 0.062 (9.29)
***
 -0.062 (-8.52)
***
 
Leverage - -0.040 (-10.18)
***
 -0.025 (-4.64)
***
 -0.048 (-10.66)
***
 
Issue - -0.004 (-1.78)
*
 -0.005 (-1.55) -0.004 (-1.17) 
Cash from operations + 0.152 (10.74)
***
 0.184 (17.80)
***
 0.141 (7.86)
***
 
Big5 + 0.028 (5.16)
***
 0.033 (6.67)
***
 0.019 (2.34)
**
 
Industry specialist + -0.003 (-0.41) -0.002 (-0.18) -0.007 (-0.81) 
Firm age + 0.006 (2.14)
**
 -0.002 (-0.54) 0.016 (2.69)
***
 
Client importance ? -0.003 (-0.46) -0.016 (-2.04)
**
 0.010 (0.81) 
Fee ratio ? -0.001 (-1.22) 0.000 (-0.40) -0.006 (-13.83)
***
 
Lagged accruals - -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 -0.011 (-1.29) -0.036 (-2.93)
***
 
Industry &Year ? Included Included Included 
Intercept ? -0.365 (-13.27)
***
 -0.455 (-12.26)
***
 -0.251 (-9.11)
***
 
n  27,756 14,836 12,920 
Adjusted R-Square  0.271 0.287 0.310 
Goodness of fit  156.85
***
 95.78
***
 82.84
***
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 refer to two tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
See Table 1 for other variable definitions. Industry and year dummy variables included in the regression, 
but not reported. 
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Table 4 
 
Alternative audit quality measures regressed on audit market concentration and control variables. Concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index of audit fees 
by auditor office in each MSA, as described in Section 2.1. Coefficient estimates and t-statistics of estimating the regression equation (4): 
 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Column 3 
Audit quality 
(-1)*|DA_KLW| 
Column 4 
Audit quality 
(-1)*| υt | 
Column 5 
Audit quality 
(-1)*σ(υ) 
Column 6 
Audit quality 
(-1)*Disc [| υt |] 
Column 7 
Audit quality 
(-1)*Disc [σ(υ)] 
  Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) 
Concentration + 0.038 (5.11)
***
 0.014 (3.82)
***
 0.015 (4.35)
***
 0.008 (2.46)
**
 0.008 (2.73)
***
 
Size + 0.017 (10.80)
***
 0.008 (23.16)
***
 0.007 (20.07)
***
 0.000 (-1.21) 0.000 (-0.33) 
Short tenure + -0.001 (-0.24) 0.000 (-0.24) 0.000 (-0.15) 0.000 (0.36) 0.003 (1.81)
*
 
Sales change - -0.064 (-6.83)
***
 -0.004 (-2.40)
**
 -0.008 (-4.00)
***
 0.001 (0.41) -0.004 (-1.32) 
Book to market + 0.011 (5.57)
***
 0.006 (5.92)
***
 0.004 (6.79)
***
 0.001 (1.43) 0.000 (-0.12) 
Loss - 0.004 (0.57) -0.003 (-4.05)
***
 -0.002 (-2.55)
**
 0.004 (2.71)
***
 0.003 (0.73) 
Leverage - -0.041 (-11.05)
***
 -0.012 (-4.76)
***
 -0.020 (-9.43)
***
 -0.016 (-3.05)
***
 -0.036 (-2.58)
***
 
Issue - -0.005 (-1.11) -0.001 (-0.92) 0.000 (-0.44) 0.000 (0.02) 0.001 (0.32) 
CFO + 0.213 (36.36)
***
 0.018 (6.22)
***
 0.017 (7.29)
***
 -0.016 (-3.27)
***
 -0.015 (-1.40) 
Big5 + 0.031 (5.81)
***
 0.002 (1.29) 0.005 (1.77)
*
 0.003 (1.46) 0.004 (1.69)
*
 
Industry specialist + 0.000 (-0.01) 0.000 (-0.05) -0.004 (-1.68)
*
 0.001 (0.54) -0.001 (-0.52) 
Firm age + 0.008 (3.83)
***
 0.005 (4.13)
***
 0.002 (2.16)
**
 0.001 (0.93) -0.001 (-0.55) 
Client importance ? -0.013 (-1.55) -0.002 (-0.92) -0.002 (-0.74) -0.003 (-1.28) 0.001 (0.25) 
Fee ratio ? -0.001 (-1.91)
*
 0.000 (0.76) 0.000 (-0.46) 0.000 (0.99) 0.000 (-0.60) 
Lagged accruals - -0.018 (-1.83)
*
 -0.025 (-4.57)
***
 -0.003 (-1.42) -0.028 (-2.61)
***
 -0.012 (-0.98) 
Industry & Year ?  Included Included Included Included Included 
Intercept ? -0.468 (-16.95)
***
 -0.174 (-24.32)
***
 -0.139 (-22.67)
***
 0.002 (0.18) 0.007 (0.38) 
n  27,756 19,764 14,327 11,903 11,896 
Adj. R-Square  0.243 0.377 0.213 0.084 0.099 
Goodness of fit  149.71
***
 179.27
***
 105.14
***
 6.75
***
 13.25
***
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 refer to two tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
See Table 1 for other variable definitions. Industry and year dummy variables included in the regression, but not reported. 
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Table 5 
Alternative audit market concentration measures as independent variables in a regression of audit quality (= (-1)*|DA_BS|) on concentration and control 
variables. Coefficient estimates and t-statistics of estimating the regression equation (4). 
 
 Predict. 
sign 
Column 3 
Based on number of 
clients 
Column 4 
Based on total 
assets of clients 
Column 5 
Based on audit fees, 
for large clients of 
Big 5 auditors only 
Column 6 
Based on audit fees, 
for non-Big 5 and 
small Big 5 clients 
only 
Column 7 
Square root of 
concentration based 
on audit fees 
Column 8 
Rank of 
concentration based 
on audit fees 
  Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) 
Concentration + 0.040 (4.05)
***
 0.018 (2.68)
***
 0.023 (2.60)
***
 0.064 (6.25)
***
 0.049 (4.88)
***
 0.000 (3.06)
***
 
Size + 0.013 (7.87)
***
 0.013 (7.98)
***
 0.004 (1.71)
*
 0.020 (10.01)
***
 0.013 (7.92)
***
 0.013 (7.91)
***
 
Short tenure + -0.002 (-0.53) -0.002 (-0.51) -0.012 (-1.64) -0.002 (-0.43) -0.002 (-0.55) -0.002 (-0.54) 
Sales change - -0.060 (-7.94)
***
 -0.060 (-7.99)
***
 -0.075 (-3.60)
***
 -0.056 (-10.00)
***
 -0.060 (-7.96)
***
 -0.060 (-7.99)
***
 
Book to market + 0.008 (3.53)
***
 0.008 (3.47)
***
 0.006 (1.83)
*
 0.008 (3.59)
***
 0.008 (3.36)
***
 0.008 (3.36)
***
 
Loss - -0.006 (-1.31) -0.007 (-1.35) -0.039 (-5.70)
***
 0.003 (0.64) -0.006 (-1.30) -0.006 (-1.34) 
Leverage - -0.039 (-10.01)
***
 -0.040 (-10.11)
***
 -0.007 (-0.28) -0.039 (-10.97)
***
 -0.040 (-10.19)
***
 -0.040 (-10.12)
***
 
Issue - -0.004 (-1.71)
*
 -0.004 (-1.75)
*
 0.003 (0.78) -0.008 (-3.27)
***
 -0.004 (-1.78)
*
 -0.004 (-1.77)
*
 
CFO + 0.152 (10.73)
***
 0.152 (10.71)
***
 0.139 (3.05)
***
 0.149 (11.84)
***
 0.152 (10.75)
***
 0.152 (10.75)
***
 
Big5 + 0.028 (5.55)
***
 0.029 (5.34)
***
 NA 0.022 (3.86)
***
 0.028 (5.13)
***
 0.029 (5.18)
***
 
Industry specialist + -0.004 (-0.49) -0.003 (-0.40) 0.003 (0.50) NA -0.003 (-0.41) -0.003 (-0.35) 
Firm age + 0.006 (2.20)
**
 0.006 (2.19)
**
 0.009 (2.68)
***
 0.007 (2.22)
**
 0.006 (2.12)
**
 0.006 (2.19)
**
 
Client importance ? -0.003 (-0.32) 0.000 (-0.01) 0.004 (0.44) 0.000 (0.03) -0.003 (-0.47) 0.000 (-0.05) 
Fee ratio ? -0.001 (-1.22) -0.001 (-1.21) 0.000 (-0.21) -0.004 (-3.41)
***
 -0.001 (-1.22) -0.001 (-1.22) 
Lagged accruals - -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 -0.042 (-2.24)
**
 -0.021 (-1.90)
*
 -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 -0.024 (-1.99)
**
 
Industry & Year ? Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Intercept ? -0.362 (-12.80)
***
 -0.363 (-13.40)
***
 -0.197 (-12.61)
***
 -0.443 (-13.46)
***
 -0.380 (-14.14)
***
 -0.336 (-10.55)
***
 
n  27,756 27,756 6,908 20,848 27,756 27,756 
Adj. R-Square  0.271 0.271 0.219 0.269 0.271 0.271 
Goodness of fit  156.94
***
 156.82
***
 30.94
***
 111.03
***
 156.83
***
 156.88
***
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 refer to two tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
See Table 1 for other variable definitions. Industry and year dummy variables included in the regression, but not reported. 
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Table 6 
Testing for differences in the relationship between audit quality and audit market concentration for different sub-groups of the sample, namely, large and small 
MSAs, large and small client firms, MSAs with and without the presence of all Big 5 audit firms, and clients of industry specialist and non-industry-specialist 
auditors. Indicator variables denoting sub-samples are interacted with concentration and introduced as additional independent variables in Eq. (4). Coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics of estimating the regression equation (4), the dependent variable is (-1)*|DA_BS|, and concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index 
of audit fees by auditor office in each MSA, as described in Section 2.1:  
 Predicted 
sign 
Column 3 
Indicator: 
Large MSA 
Column 4 
Indicator: 
Large Firm 
Column 5 
Indicator: 
Max big5 
Column 6 
Indicator: 
Industry specialist 
  Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) Coeff. (t-value) 
Concentration + 0.038 (4.84)
***
 0.047 (4.40)
***
 0.038 (4.28)
***
 0.037 (5.05)
***
 
Concentration * Indicator ? 0.004 (0.19) -0.023 (-1.04) 0.022 (0.98) 0.009 (0.11) 
Indicator Variable ? 0.000 (-0.03) -0.009 (-0.97) -0.003 (-0.33) NA 
Size + 0.013 (8.07)
***
 0.016 (6.15)
***
 0.013 (7.93)
***
 0.013 (7.92)
***
 
Short tenure + -0.002 (-0.54) -0.003 (-0.61) -0.002 (-0.55) -0.002 (-0.54) 
Sales change - -0.060 (-7.95)
***
 -0.060 (-8.20)
***
 -0.060 (-7.99)
***
 -0.060 (-7.94)
***
 
Book to market + 0.008 (3.36)
***
 0.008 (3.41)
***
 0.008 (3.33)
***
 0.008 (3.39)
***
 
Loss - -0.006 (-1.33) -0.007 (-1.50) -0.006 (-1.30) -0.006 (-1.30) 
Leverage - -0.040 (-10.17)
***
 -0.038 (-9.78)
***
 -0.040 (-10.22)
***
 -0.040 (-10.18)
***
 
Issue - -0.004 (-1.76)
*
 -0.004 (-1.61) -0.004 (-1.77)
*
 -0.004 (-1.78)
*
 
Cash from operations + 0.152 (10.76)
***
 0.151 (10.47)
***
 0.152 (10.77)
***
 0.152 (10.75)
***
 
Big5 + 0.029 (4.99)
***
 0.029 (5.40)
***
 0.028 (5.15)
***
 0.028 (5.18)
***
 
Industry specialist + -0.003 (-0.42) -0.003 (-0.41) -0.003 (-0.41) -0.006 (-0.23) 
Firm age + 0.006 (2.13)
**
 0.006 (2.14)
**
 0.006 (2.13)
**
 0.006 (2.14)
**
 
Client importance ? -0.003 (-0.42) -0.004 (-0.49) -0.003 (-0.43) -0.003 (-0.46) 
Fee ratio ? -0.001 (-1.22) -0.001 (-1.19) -0.001 (-1.23) -0.001 (-1.22) 
Lagged accruals - -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 -0.024 (-2.00)
**
 
Industry &Year ? Included Included Included Included 
Intercept ? -0.365 (-12.66)
***
 -0.395 (-10.80)
***
 -0.367 (-11.65)
***
 -0.365 (-13.25)
***
 
n  27,756 27,756 27,756 27,756 
Adjusted R-Square  0.271 0.272 0.271 0.271 
Goodness of fit  148.53
***
 149.14
***
 148.00
***
 152.23
***
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 refer to two tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
See Table 1 for other variable definitions. Industry and year dummy variables included in the regression, but not reported. 
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Table 7 
Relationship between audit fees and audit market concentration. Concentration is measured by the 
Herfindahl index of audit fees by auditor office in each MSA, as described in Section 2.1. Coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics of estimating the following regression equation: 
Ln(Audit fees) = β0 + β1 Concentration + β2 Size + β3 Loss + β4 Firm age + β5 Bankruptcy + β6 Xtra 
 + β7 Sqsegs + β8 GC + β9 IC audit + β10 IC weakness + β11 Sign dual+ β12 Risk Ind  
 + β13 plan + β14 Foreign + β15 Audit lag + β16 New finance + β17 Sqemps + β18 Inv rec  
 + β19 Mergers + β20 CFO + β21 Liquidity + β22 Restatement + β23 Resignation 
 + β24 Re Diss + β25 Initial + β26 Median wage + β27 Specialist + β28 MSA rank  
 + β29 MSA area + Σ γjIndustry  + Σ θtYear + ω  (5) 
 
 Predict. 
sign 
Column 3 
Concentration for only 
large Big 5 Clients 
Column 4 
Concentration based 
on audit fees 
Column 5 
Concentration based 
on number of clients 
  Coeff.: (t-value) Coeff.: (t-value) Coeff.: (t-value) 
Concentration ? 0.154 (3.08)
***
 0.086 (1.55) 0.137 (2.10)
**
 
Size + 0.400 (91.11)
***
 0.400 (91.10)
***
 0.399 (90.84)
***
 
Loss + 0.133 (13.82)
***
 0.132 (13.80)
***
 0.132 (13.76)
***
 
Firm Age + 0.002 (4.53)
***
 0.002 (4.59)
***
 0.002 (4.65)
***
 
Bankruptcy + 0.195 (8.12)
***
 0.196 (8.14)
***
 0.196 (8.17)
***
 
Xtra + 0.158 (11.47)
***
 0.158 (11.45)
***
 0.158 (11.48)
***
 
Sqsegs + 0.060 (11.56)
***
 0.059 (11.51)
***
 0.059 (11.50)
***
 
GC + 0.114 (5.16)
***
 0.114 (5.16)
***
 0.113 (5.13)
***
 
IC audit + 0.580 (31.25)
***
 0.579 (31.22)
***
 0.579 (31.22)
***
 
IC weakness + 0.303 (9.15)
***
 0.303 (9.12)
***
 0.302 (9.08)
***
 
Sign dual + 0.126 (3.70)
***
 0.127 (3.71)
***
 0.127 (3.72)
***
 
Risk Ind + 0.044 (3.18)
***
 0.043 (3.09)
***
 0.040 (2.92)
***
 
Plan + 0.187 (15.51)
***
 0.186 (15.43)
***
 0.186 (15.43)
***
 
Foreign + 0.209 (18.53)
***
 0.209 (18.55)
***
 0.209 (18.53)
***
 
Audit lag + 0.002 (9.27)
***
 0.002 (9.29)
***
 0.002 (9.31)
***
 
New finance + 0.022 (2.68)
***
 0.022 (2.69)
***
 0.023 (2.73)
***
 
Sqemps + 0.057 (13.44)
***
 0.057 (13.45)
***
 0.057 (13.51)
***
 
Inv rec + 0.425 (14.98)
***
 0.425 (14.98)
***
 0.426 (15.00)
***
 
Mergers + 0.111 (10.43)
***
 0.111 (10.41)
***
 0.112 (10.45)
***
 
CFO - -0.173 (-10.33)
***
 -0.173 (-10.31)
***
 -0.172 (-10.30)
***
 
Liquidity - -0.009 (-2.58)
***
 -0.009 (-2.58)
***
 -0.009 (-2.57)
**
 
Restatement + -0.009 (-0.63) -0.009 (-0.63) -0.009 (-0.64) 
Resignation + 0.228 (2.62)
***
 0.228 (2.61)
***
 0.228 (2.61)
***
 
Re Diss + 0.329 (3.57)
***
 0.329 (3.57)
***
 0.330 (3.57)
***
 
Initial - -0.250 (-8.24)
***
 -0.250 (-8.24)
***
 -0.249 (-8.23)
***
 
Median wage + 0.000 (16.09)
***
 0.000 (16.15)
***
 0.000 (15.91)
***
 
Specialist + 0.050 (1.75)
*
 0.050 (1.75)
*
 0.047 (1.63) 
MSA Rank ? -0.003 (-9.49)
***
 -0.003 (-8.57)
***
 -0.003 (-8.74)
***
 
MSA Area + 0.000 (0.99) 0.000 (1.05) 0.000 (1.15) 
Industry and Year  ? Included Included Included 
Intercept ? 5.729 (53.86)
***
 5.739 (54.01)
***
 5.745 (54.04)
***
 
n   15,952 15,952 15,952 
Adjusted R-Square  0.827 0.827 0.827 
Goodness of Fit  1,664
***
 1,662
***
 1,661
***
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
, refer to two tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Industry and year dummy variables included in the regression, but not reported. 
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Below are the definitions of variables in Eq. (5): 
Ln(Audit fees) = log of current fiscal year reported audit fees. The source of audit fee data is Audit 
Analytics; 
Size   = natural logarithm of total assets (TA) (Compustat #6) after measured in $ thousands; 
Loss             =     an indicator variable equal to one if the audit client reported a loss in the current or 
previous fiscal year (Compustat #172); zero otherwise; 
Firm Age  = number of fiscal years since the company’s initial public offering use IPO data in 
Compustat, and manually obtained if missing; 
Bankruptcy   = probability of bankruptcy score based on Zmijewski (1984); 
Xtra  = an indicator variable equal to one if the audit client reported extraordinary items or 
discontinued operations if the absolute value exceeds $10,000; zero otherwise.  Data 
are obtained from Compustat #48; 
Sqsegs   = the square root of the number of segments, where number of segments are obtained 
from Compustat  (Business Information - Segment Item Value File, Segment 
Identifier); 
GC    = an indicator variable equal to one if the audit opinion includes a going concern 
modification; zero otherwise.  The source of audit opinion data is Audit Analytics; 
IC audit  = an indicator variable equal to one if the annual report includes an opinion on 
management’s assessment of internal control in accordance with Section 404 of the 
SOX; zero otherwise; 
IC weakness = an indicator variable equal to one if the annual report includes an opinion on 
management’s assessment reported ineffective internal control (i.e, adverse); zero 
otherwise; 
Sign dual   = is an indicator variable equal to one if the audit opinion is dual-dated (or more) for 
events occurring after completion of field work for audit procedures; zero otherwise; 
Risk Ind  = dichotomous variable equal to one if primary SIC is defined as a Arisky industry@; 
zero otherwise. 
Plan  = an indicator variable equal to one if the company has a pension or post-retirement 
plan, where existence is defined as either current year plan assets or cost > $1 million; 
zero otherwise.  Data are obtained from Compustat Xpressfeed North America 
Dataset (aco_pnfnda); 
Foreign   = an indicator variable equal to one if the audit client has foreign operations as indicated 
by foreign currency adjustments to income (Compustat #150); zero otherwise.  A firm 
is considered to have foreign operations if the absolute value of the Foreign Currency 
Adjustment Account exceeds $10,000; 
Audit lag   = is the number of days between audit opinion signature date and fiscal year end.  If the 
audit opinion is dual-dated (or more), the initial date is used as that date represents the 
last day of field work for audit procedures and the last day for the auditor’s 
responsibility for review of events that occur after the balance sheet date.  Dual-dating 
(or more) suggests additional work and disclosures only for the new event occurring 
after completion of field work. 
New finance  = indicator variable for material new equity issue or debt (Compustat #108 and #111) is 
greater $50,000 ($ actuals); 
Sqemps   = the square root of the number of employees (Compustat #29 and Compact Disclosure-
SEC, measured in thousands) disclosed in Form 10-K filings; 
Inv rec   = inventory plus accounts receivable (Compustat #3 + #2) deflated by total assets TAt-1. 
Mergers  = indicator variable equal to one for mergers and acquisitions (AFTN #1 = ‘AA’, ‘AB’, 
‘AR’, ‘AS’, ‘FA’, ‘FB’, ‘FC’, ‘FD’, ‘FE’, ‘FF’, ‘FW’), and zero otherwise; 
CFO  =  Cash flow from operations (Compustat # 308) deflated by assets TAt-1; 
Liquidity  =  Ratio of current assets less inventory divided by current liabilities; 
Restatement = an indicator variable equal to one if client announced a restatement in the previous 
financial year, zero otherwise; 
Resignation  = an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor audit firm resigned from the audit 
engagement; zero otherwise; 
Re Diss  = an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor audit firm had a disagreement or 
reportable event with the client; zero otherwise; 
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Initial  = an indicator variable equal to one if there is an auditor change in that fiscal year; zero 
otherwise. All auditor changes are to and from Big 5 auditors; 
Median wage = hourly median wage of auditors and accountants obtained from 2007 Metropolitan 
Area Occupational Employment Statistics published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; 
Specialist  =  dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is an industry specialist both at the national 
level and at the city (MSA) level, and zero otherwise. Following Reichelt and Wang 
(2008), an auditor is defined as a national (city) industry specialist if it has an annual 
audit fee market share greater than 40 percent in an industry, based on the two-digit 
SIC code in the national (city) audit market; 
MSA rank = rank of the MSAsize based on the population of the MSA given in 2000 U.S. Census; 
and   
MSA area = the total area of the MSA given in 2000 U.S. Census. 
 
 
 
